This papers uses a general equilibrium DSGE model to estimate the SARB´s policy reaction rule. We …nd that the SARB has a stable rule very much in line with those estimated for Canada, UK, Australia and New Zeland. The distinguishing characteristics are a somewhat larger weight on output and a very low weight on the exchange rate. Relative to other emerging economies, the policy reaction function of the SARB appears to be much more stable.
Introduction and Motivation
Characterizing monetary policy presents a signi…cant empirical challenge. Since early 1970s when the rise of in ‡ation led to increased skepticism on the role of monetary policy, a signi…cant body of literature has framed the debate over monetary policy as that of choosing the appropriate nominal anchor, motivated in part by the concepts of time inconsistency and in ‡ation bias 1 . Monetary 1 The seminal contribution was Kydland and Prescott (1977) for which they obtained the Nobel price in 2005. Calvo (1978) provided an alternative modelization, focusing on the time inconsistency problem of domestically denominated debt. The setup achieved textbook status with Barro and Gordon (1983) . In later years the problem of time inconsistency led to an explosion of work, in particular on ways to deal with it. See Rogo¤ (1985) on appointing conservative central bankers, Backus and Dri¢ l (1985) or Cukierman and Meltzer (1986) on reputation models, Alesina (1988) and Alesina and Summers (1993) on the independence of the Central Bank, validated in Grilli, Masciandaro and Tabellini, 1991 and Cukierman, Webb and Neyapti, 1992) . The time inconsistency debate has been and is still a key feature of monetary policy debates, all the way through the current debate on in ‡ation targeting. policy as a result has been discussed as a tension between the credibility provided by an anchor, and the costs of the anchor in terms of a smaller degree of ‡exibility to respond to shocks. On occasions the anchor becomes too rigid so that the key issue becomes one of …nding a credible anchor that does not jeopardize the ability to react to shocks. This is the dilemma that monetary policy has had to confront.
Of course one could approach the issue of describing monetary policy by ranking countries according to their stated anchors, typically, the exchange rate, monetary aggregates or the in ‡ation rate, the standard anchors used by the IMF´s exchange rate and monetary framework classi…cation.
Reality is a bit more complex. For one, some of these targets show some overlaps. Sterne (1999) provides a more nuanced view making sure to capture the overlaps in the targets. His Figure 1 , shows the trend in regimes during the 1990s, showing how the weight among them has changed over recent years. For once, most countries have embraced the use of explicit targets, though among these monetary targets appear to have fallen in disregard. But even when this classi…cation allows to assess the possibility of multiple anchors, again, these are de jure statements on the objective of monetary policy, but as much as in the large literature on de facto exchange rate classi…cations 2 , there is the question of how relevant thes anchors are, as opposed to other variables that central bankers may be concerned about and looking at. In other words are stated intentions for real? For example, the SARB has repeatedly claimed that it does not care about the movements in the exchange rate. Do its actions respond to this statement?
A very common problem is that of countries that claim to use the exchange rate as an anchor but actually let this exchange rate move all the time. In practice the stated anchor stops being a relevant anchor. A similar problem arises, for example with monetary targeting. Mishkin (2007) describes the problems with measuring monetary aggregates making it di¢ cult to assess if the anchor is binding or not:
"Why did monetary targeting in the United States, Canada and the United Kingdom during the late 1970s and the 1980s not prove successful in controlling in ‡ation? There are two interpretations . . . One is that monetary targeting was not pursued seriously, so it never had a chance to succeed. The Federal Reserve, Bank of Canada, and particularly the Bank of England, engaged in substantial game playing in which they targeted multiple aggregates, allowed base drift (the initial starting point for the monetary target was allowed to shift up and down with realizations of the monetary aggregate), did not announce targets on a regular schedule, used arti…cial means to bring down the growth of a targeted aggregate, often overshot their targets without reversing the overshoot later and often obscured the reasons why deviations from the monetary targets occurred."
And the same ambiguity applies (and is seldom acknowledged) even with in ‡ation targeting regimes. Mishkin and Schmidt Hebbel (2001) mention that "Classifying country cases into in ‡ation targeting and other monetary regimes involves subjective choices for two reasons. First, there is lack of full agreement on the main conditions and features of in ‡a-tion targeting and how they apply during transition to low in ‡ation . . . Second, some countries have used simultaneously in ‡ation targts and other nominal anchors (the exchange rate and/or a monetary aggregate), particularly at their early years of in ‡ation targeting. "
In addition in ‡ation targeters di¤er signi…cantly on many dimensions: target price index, target width, target horizon, escape clauses, accountability of target misses, goal independence, and overall transparency and accountability regarding the conduct of monetary policy under in ‡ation targeting. In ‡ation targetting is in practice a broad category that includes a large array of alternative varieties, going from soft numerical in ‡ation target (in the form of a wide in ‡ation band) to the a more sophisticated system that includes, additionally: (i) a legal commitment to price stability as the primary goal of monetary policy, (ii) a dissemination strategy that allows agents to replicate and anticipate the policy decision context (if not the actual policy decision); (iii) direct accountability of the central bank management for attaining the targets. Historically, middle income developing countries adopting IT gradually proceed from the soft version (which in the early years usually coexists with a dirty exchange rate regimes, see Schmidt-Hebbel and Tapia 2002 for Chile; and Armas et al. 2006 for Peru; Fraga et al. 2005 for Brazil, and Mishkin (2006) for everything else) to the more canonical version.
This caveat is more generally related with a de…nitional problem that plague in ‡ation targeting as a distinct policy: if by in ‡ation targeting one means an explicit commitment with low and stable in ‡ation, then most central banks in mature economies (and most in high-middle income ones) are in fact in ‡ation targetters. Thus, as it appears, the empirical characterization of in ‡ation targeting, in practice, hinges on the two other pillars mentioned above, namely, dissemination and accountability, the boundaries of what constitutes IT and what not are rather fussy.
With such a large dimensionality to characterize monetary policy it is di¢ -cult to provide a clean description. In particular, in a context of in ‡ation inertia due to (implicit or explicit) backward indexation, and high pass-through due to dollar pricing, the exchange rate is a natural candidate to anchor in ‡ation expectations. So that even when monetary aggregates are supposed to be the target exchange rate may play a role.To see this consider countries that are categorized by the IMF as ‡oaters. When looking at the degree of intervention in exchange rate markets one obtains the following distribution of interventions. ?log(rese rves)
Density
Not only are the two virtually indistinguishable. They show that interventions in exchange rate markets are pervasive even among the so called ‡oaters a point that had been raised early on by Calvo and Reinhart (2002) . Using a de facto classi…cation of exchange rate regimes Sturzenegger 2005, 2007) for Mexico, Brazil, Argentian, Korea, Malaysia and Thailand allows to make the point in a di¤erent way. All these countries appear in the IMF classi…cation as pure ‡oaters or managed ‡oating regimes. The shaded area corresponds to the periods after the crises where countries opted away from a full ‡oat in spite of allegedly embracing exchange rate ‡exibility. Bryant, Hooper and Mann (1993) concluded that policy rules typically conformed to the "stated dual objective of many central banks to achieve sustainable growth in real activity while avoiding in ‡ation"(p. 225). In recent years there has been an active literature trying to estimate the policy reaction function of Central Banks, following Taylor's innovative (1993) description of a simple rule by which interest rates were adjusted in response to in ‡ation changes and the output gap. Taylor suggested that the simple equation
represented US policy fairly well. Orphanides (2001a Orphanides ( , 2001b criticizes this rule on the basis that the information used by it is unavailable to policy makers at the time of the decision, and thus impossible, and suggests a rule based on information available at the time. Clarida, Gali and Gertler (2000) suggest that the Taylor rule has more to do with expectations of in ‡ation and the output gap, and use an IV GMM procedure to estimate it, instrumenting future values of in ‡ation and output on current and lagged information.
But do these Taylor rules depend exclusively on the in ‡ation rate and the output gap as suggested by Taylor or do they take into consideration other variables? As we mentioned above in developing countries in particular, it is likely that the exchange rate plays an important role as well. In fact, a simple model can show how, in a typical developing economy with in ‡ation inertia, …nancial dollarization and high pass through, the exchange rate naturally belongs into the in ‡ation targeting rule. To see this consider the following reduced model of a small open economy under IT, based on the backward-looking framework in Ball (1999):
y t = r t 1 + e t 1 + y t 1 + e t (1)
where r is the real interest rate, e the (log) real exchange rate, y the (log) output gap, and in ‡ation.
To solve the model, we update (2) two periods and impose an in ‡ation target (which, without loss of generality, we can assume equal to zero), to obtain 0 = E t t+1 + E t y t+1 + E t (e t+1 e t ) + t Next, we update (1) and (2) one period and take expectations:
Finally, substituting (3) and (4) into (1) and rearranging, we have the following equation (where the left hand side is referred to as the Monetary Conditions Indicator, or MCI):
The …rst, trivial thing to note here is that a change in the nominal exchange rate e demands a compensating change in r t . In other words, monetary policy under IT cannot neglect exchange rate ‡uctuations. The reaction function and the direction of the policy response, however, would depend on a number of factors: the interest rate e¤ect through domestic absorption ( ), the pass-through of the exchange rate change to domestic prices , the e¤ect of a depreciation on domestic demand, ; and the link between the interest rate and the exchange rate, the equation needed to close the model.
For example, assuming uncovered interest rate parity, E t (e t+1 e t ) = r t r f t (where r f the international interest rate) implies that, in general, exchange rate changes would elicit a countervailing interest rate move in the opposite direction, as (IT) becomes:
which for very low pass-throughs (! = = ) would be roughly equal to the tradables share of GDP. However, interest rate increases that raise the exchange rate may be "in ‡ationary"if the pass-through coe¢ cient is too large ( > ). Similarly, contractionary devaluations ( < 0) that may arise, for example, due to balance sheet e¤ects in …nancially dollarized economies, may call for lower interest rates if <-= . Finally, when the foreign exchange market is under speculative pressure, lowering interest rates would reduce the cost of shorting the domestic currency and fuel a run. In those cases, the authorities may choose to intervene directly in the forex market.
This simple example helps dilucidate the distinction between foreign exchange intervention and exchange rate targeting, and illustrates the severe identi…cation problems associated with it. In developing economies with large passthrough or balance sheet concerns, one would expect that the central bank reacts to exchange rate ‡uctuations (either though interest rates adjustments or outright forex intervention) even in the absence of an exchange rate target. Moreover, in some cases, two regimes coexist: a FIT (or, more generally, a ‡exi-ble regime with autonomous monetary policy) that tolerates moderate exchange rate movements, together with a de facto peg activated by substantial exchange rate realignments.
An alternative story for including the exchange rate in the Taylor rule is provided in a recent paper by Engel and Devereux (2007) who explore the implications of the fact that exchange rates respond primarily to news about future fundamentals. An overly brief synopsis of the main lesson from the new Keynesian economics is that monetary policy should aim -to the extent it can -to eliminate the distortions introduced by sticky nominal prices. Ideally, monetary policy should try to reproduce the outcome that would be achieved if nominal prices were ‡exible. In open economies with price stickiness relative prices change when the nominal exchange rate changes. If the exchange rate drives the change in relative prices the problem is that those relative prices are changing when there is news about future fundamentals (monetary and real) potentially moving the economy away from its short run equilibrium. If goods prices were ‡exible, then relative goods prices would not be in ‡uenced by news about the future that is driving the nominal exchange rate, but if prices are rigid there is a distortion in relative prices caused by nominal price stickiness. Since most of the variation in exchange rates comes from news about these future fundamentals, most exchange rate variation generates ine¢ cient relative price movements in the short run. Engel and Deveraux argue that this provides a case for monetary policy to target unexpected changes in nominal exchange rates in addition to targeting in ‡ation. In developing countries Hausmann, Panizza and Rigobon (2006) argue that exchange rate volatility is signi…cant larger than in industrial countries in a way that cannot be explained by fundamentals, providing a justi…cation for including the exchange rate in their reaction function.
How can the presence of the exchange rate be identi…ed in the reaction function of the Central Bank? One alternative is to extend the methodology of Clarida, Gali and Gertler (2000) and estimate a univariate model. An alternative is to estimate a structural model. Lubik and Shorfheide (2007) use a Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium (DSGE) model and Bayesian techniques to estimate a Taylor rule for a small open economy that includes the exchange rate. They estimate it for four countries: the UK, Australia, NZ and Canada. They …nd that the UK and Canadian monetary authorities do care about nominal exchange rates. This is not contradictory with in ‡ation targeting per se, but it signals how complex the measurement of monetary policy is.
In this paper we estimate a fully ‡edged DSGE model following Lubik and Shorfheide (2007) for South Africa and other countries.
Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium models
The appendix provides a description of the model. In a nutshell the new Keynesian models in international …nance typically boil down to three equations, a dynamics IS curve, a Philips curve and a policy reaction function. The IS curve is derived from the Euler equation of consumer maximization and aggregate demand matters because the models assume monopolistic competition. The Philips curve originates in the assumption of price rigidities. A very popular choice to model this price rigidity is Calvo's (1983) price staggering mechanism. In Calvo's model …rms are allowed to change prices randomly, but once they can, they do so rationally anticipating the conditions of the economy during the period they thought the price would be relevant. This structure leads to a very elegant structure. Because change opportunities appear stochastically and independently across …rms, it means that a constant fraction of …rms adjust their prices making the price level a smooth variable that changes only over time. This model provides a clean framework that has been used extensively to analyze many issues, from the question of stabilization anchors to the optimality of in ‡ation targeting. And because these models have well de…ned objective functions they allow for precise statements on welfare, a key step to evaluate policy. Monetary policy, in tun, can be described by an interest rule. With these models, the literature has come full circle, recovering the main tenets of the Mundellian approach, but now derived in coherent fully speci…ed general equilibrium models.
Speci…cally, Lubik and Shorfheide (2007) estimate a version of a model initially developed by Gali and Monacelli (2005) which in log linearized form can be described by three main equations an open economy IS-curve:
where y t denotes aggregate output, R t nominal interest rate, t is CPI in ‡ation, z t is the growth rate of an underlying non-stationary world technology process Z t , q t is the terms of trade, de…ned as the relative price of exports in terms of imports, and y t is exogenous world output. The parameter = 1 represents the elasticity of inter-temporal substitution, is the import share 3 , and z is the AR coe¢ cient of the world technology. In order to guarantee stationarity of the model, all real variables are expressed in terms of percentage deviations from Z t .
An open economy Phillips curve is obtained by using the CPI in ‡ation condition (21) and the equilibrium real marginal cost into the Phillips curve (19), and log-linearizing to obtain:
where
1 y t is potential output in the absence of nominal rigidities.
represents the discount factor while is the structural parameter that gives the slope of the Phillips curve.
The log-linear version of the interest rate rule (24) is given by
Terms of trade, in turn, are assumed to follow a law of motion for their growth rate:
Equations (30) - (34) form a linear rational expectations model. We assume that y t and t evolve according to univariate AR(1) processes with autoregressive coe¢ cients y and , respectively. The innovations of the AR(1) processes are denoted by " y ;t and " ;t . The model is solved using the method described in Sims (2002) .
Results
The results of the estimate for South Africa are shown in Figure 1 . The model is estimated in a rolling fashion including data from 1960. We typically add four quarters at a time and then add a single quarter at a time since then. The graphs show the coe¢ cients of 1 ; 2 ; 3 and R , allowing to see the evolution of the three coe¢ cients of the reaction function and how they have changed over time. 1 could be interepreted as the "anti-in ‡ation bias" in monetary policy, 2 represents el "output bias" and 3 could be called the "fear of ‡oating bias".
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While all countries in this group show strong anti in ‡ation credentials, and output appears to be relatively homogenously weighted among them, the relative importance of the exchange rate appears to be di¤erent. Canada and the UK, on the one hand, appear to give some weight to avoiding exchange rate ‡uctuations whereas Australia and New Zealand appear to do this less so. South Africa´s monetary policy appears very much in line with that of Australia and New Zealand in terms of its weight on the exchange rate, but shares with the other four a similar stance on in ‡ation. Additionally, the SARB seems to place on output stability which doubles that relative to other countries.
How do these results fare relative to other emerging economies? To do this comparison we run the model for a group of emerging economies, the results of the estimation are presented in Table 3 . The comparison with these other countries is interesting. On the one hand, the SARB appears to be on the low side in terms of its concerns for the exchange rate. This is not surprising the South African economy is well known to have avoided the "original sin" that precludes it from issuing debt in its own currency. As a result the SARB appears to be, among emerging countries, distinctively unattentive to what happens with its exchange rate. On the other hand, many countries in the list appear to have stronger weights on in ‡ation. This allows to interpretations. One is that they are more concerned with in ‡ation as an objective. The other is that they need to respond more dramatically to the in ‡ation rate in order to reign in the in ‡ationary process. This, potentially, indicates that their interest instrument is less e¤ective than in South Africa. Finally, the SARB appears to be on the higher end of interest in terms of its concern on output. This naturally follows from its lower weights on the other variables.
Finally, Table 4 compares the stability of the reaction functions across time. Appendix 2 shows the estimates for the countries, but here we just show the volatility of the parameters of the Taylor function over time. Countries in the table are order in decreasing level of instability of their Taylor rules as identi…ed by the coe¢ cient of the anti in ‡ation bias. Again the results suggest the SARB has been able to build a tradition of a stable policy reaction function. This stability is particularly striking in the period since 1994.
Conclusions
This paper estimated the policy reaction function of the SARB. We found monetary policy to be quite similar to that of Australia and New Zealand, and close to that of Canada and the UK. Relative to other emerging countries, it stands out for its stability and its relative stronger weight on output and lower relative weight on the exchange rate. It also shows a strong antin ‡ation bias.
Appendix 1. A simple structural open economy model
The description of the small open economy model follows Gali and Monacelli (2005) and it is mainly presented to make the paper self-contained. The model economy incorporates the basic microfundations standard in the New Keynesian framework. The model is presented in detail …rst and then the economy is reduced to the system of 5 equations used for estimation consisting on: (i) a forward-looking open economy IS-equation, (ii) an open economy Phillips curve, (iii) monetary policy described by an interest rate rule, (iv) an equilibrium condition describing the evolution of the nominal exchange rate 4 , and (v) an equilibrium relation describing the evolution of the terms of trade.
Households
A representative household chooses a sequence of consumption, C t , and labor, N t , to maximize expected lifetime utility
where 2 (0; 1) is the discount factor. Consumption is divided between domestic goods, C H;t , and foreign goods, C F;t , according to
where (1 ) 2 [0; 1] is associated to the degree of home bias in preferences, while > 0 measures the substitutability between domestic and foreign goods.
Household resources are composed of a portfolio of bonds holdings, D t , labor income with nominal wage, W t , and lump-sum transfers, T t . These resources are divided between one-period discount bonds with unit price E t t;t+1 , and domestic and foreign goods with prices P H;t , and P F;t , respectively. Therefore, each period maximization problem (9) is subject to the sequence of budget constraints
Optimal allocation of expenditures between domestic and imported goods is given by
is the consumer price index (CPI). Total consumption expenditure by domestic households is given by P t C t = P H;t C H;t + P F;t C F;t .
Following Gali and Monacelli, we specialize the period utility function to take the form
where 1 > 0 represents the intertemporal elasticity of substitution in consumption and 1 ' > 0 is elasticity of labor supply with respect to real wages. Then household's labor, consumption and bond holdings optimality conditions imply
and
Taking conditional expectations on both sides of (14) and rearranging we get the Euler condition
where R t = 1 Etf t;t+1 g is the gross return on the riskless one-period discount bond, with price E t t;t+1 , paying o¤ one unit of domestic currency in t + 1. Under the assumption of complete securities markets, a …rst-order condition analogous to (14) must also hold for the representative household in any country.
Firms
The small open economy is inhabited by a continuum of monopolistic competitive …rms indexed by j 2 [0; 1] that operate a CRS technology Y H;t (j) = Z t N t (j), where Z is a total factor productivity shifter following the AR(1) process (in logs) z t = z z t 1 + " t . The nominal marginal cost is given by M C n t = Wt Zt , while the real marginal cost is given by M C t = Wt P H;t Zt . To introduce nominal rigidities assume that …rms face an à la Calvo (1983) price stickiness with a probability of not being able to adjust its price in any given period. Let P H;t (j) denote the price set by …rm j adjusting its price in time t. When setting a new price in period t …rm j seeks to maximize expected pro…ts taking into account that this price will remain unchanged for k periods with probability k , and taking as given the discount household factor t;t+k . In a symmetric equilibrium all …rms adjusting its price in any given period make the same decision, so we can drop the j subscript. The …rm's problem is 
Using (14) that implies t;t+k = k C t+k Ct Pt P t+k , we can rewrite the previous condition as
or, in terms of stationary variables, . Under the assumed pricesetting structure, the dynamic of the domestic price index is described by
Combining equation (17) and (18) yields an expression for gross in ‡ation rate for domestically produced goods:
Equation (19) is the canonical form of the new optimization-based Phillips curve that arises from an environment of time-dependent staggered price setting.
CPI in ‡ation is a composite of domestic and foreign good price in ‡ation. Within a local region of the steady state, CPI in ‡ation, t , may be expressed as t = P t P t 1 = P H;t P H;t 1
(1 )
In ‡ation, terms of trade and exchange rate
Inversely to Gali and Monacelli, we de…ne the e¤ective terms of trade as the relative price of exports in terms of imports Q t P H;t P F;t
. Replacing this in (20) domestic in ‡ation, and CPI in ‡ation are related by
Assume that the law of one price holds at all times both for import and export prices, which implies that P F;t = S t P t where S t is the nominal e¤ective exchange rate and P t is the world price index. Combining the previous result with the de…nition of the terms of trade yields
Finally, by replacing P H;t from (22) into equation (21) we can get an expression relating CPI in ‡ation with foreign in ‡ation, terms of trade changes and exchange rate changes.
is world in ‡ation.
Monetary policy
Monetary policy is described by an interest rate rule of the form
where r is the steady-state real interest rate, is the target in ‡ation rate, which in equilibrium coincides with the steady-state in ‡ation rate, Y t is the level of output that would prevail in the absence of nominal rigidities, R captures the partial adjustment of the interest rate to target, while 1 ; 2 ; and 3 captures the monetary authorities reaction to in ‡ation, output and exchange rate ‡uctuations.
Equilibrium
World's goods market clearing condition requires that world consumption represented by the index C t is equal to the world output index Y t
Domestic goods market clearing requires that domestic production meets domestic demand and exports C H;t
Domestic economy asset accumulation follows
Finally, bonds market clearing requires that there is no excess demand for bonds
Log-linearization and simpli…cation
The model economy described above can be simpli…ed and log-linearize to yield the following system of 5 equations as in Lubik and Schorfheide (2007) , and that will be the basis for estimation. All small letters denote log-deviations from steady-state. Using the log-linear terms of trade evolution condition
and the goods markets clearing conditions (25) and (26) into the Euler equation (15) we get an open economy IS-curve:
where y t denotes aggregate output, R t nominal interest rate, t is CPI in‡ation, z t is the growth rate of an underlying non-stationary world technology process Z t , q t is the terms of trade, de…ned as the relative price of exports in terms of imports, and y t is exogenous world output. The parameter = 1 represents the elasticity of inter-temporal substitution, is the import share 5 , and z is the AR coe¢ cient of the world technology. In order to guarantee stationarity of the model, all real variables are expressed in terms of percentage deviations from Z t .
where y t = (2 ) 1 y t is potential output in the absence of nominal rigidities.
In order to study exchange rate policies we log-linearize equation (23) to obtain:
where t is a world in ‡ation shock which we treat as an unobservable. The log-linear version of the interest rate rule (24) is given by
Even when the above conditions make use of the equilibrium condition for the terms of trade (29), estimation of the fully structural model turns out to be problematic because the model is very restricted. Therefore we follow Lubik and Schorfheide (2007) and use a law of motion for their growth rate:
Equations (30) -(34) form a linear rational expectations model. We assume that y t and t evolve according to univariate AR(1) processes with autoregressive coe¢ cients y and , respectively. The innovations of the AR(1) processes are denoted by " y ;t and " ;t . The model is solved using the method described in Sims (2002) .
Estimation strategy and empirical implementation 5.7.1 Bayesian estimation of the DSGE model
The monetary policy rule cannot be consistently estimated by ordinary least squares because the regressors are endogenous, that is, E " R t j t ; y t ; e t 6 = 0. System based methods correct for the endogeneity by adjusting the non-zero conditional expectation of the monetary policy shock. The monetary policy rule is implicitly replaced by the following equation:
The likelihood function associated with the DSGE model discussed above is used to generate the correction term E " R t j t ; y t ; e t . Potential e¢ ciency gains are exploited by imposing all the rational expectations cross-coe¢ cient restrictions.
The DSGE model presented above is estimated using Bayesian methods 6 . The object of interest is the vector of parameters = 1 ; 2 ; 3 ; R ; ; ; ; ; q ; z ; y ; ; R ; q ; z ; y ;
Given a prior p ( ), the posterior density of the model parameters, , is given by
where L j Y T is the likelihood conditional on observed data Y T = fY 1 ; : : : ; Y T g. In our case Y t = [ y t + z t ; 4 t ; 4R t ; e t ; q t ] 0 . The likelihood function is computed under the assumption of normally distributed disturbances by combining the state-space representation implied by the solution of the linear rational expectations model and the Kalhman …lter. Posterior draws are obtained using Markov Chain Monte Carlo methods. After obtaining an approximation to the mode of the posterior, a Random Walk Metropolis algorithm is used to generate posterior draws. Point estimates and measures of uncertainty for are obtained from the generated values. Below we report the mean and the 90% con…dence interval.
Once we have this, inferential exercises are straightforward. For example, we could study the propagation and relative importance of structural shocks through impulse response functions and variance decompositions.
Data
The model is estimated using quarterly data on real output growth, in ‡ation, nominal interest rates, exchange rates changes, and terms of trade changes. Data availability varies across countries and it comes from the IMF's International Financial Statistics and countries'central banks and statistical agencies. Output growth rates are computed as natural logarithm (ln) di¤erences of the seasonal adjusted real gross domestic product. In ‡ation rates are ln di¤erences of the consumer price indices, multiplied by 4 to annualize. Nominal interest rates are reported in levels and correspond to the best available proxy for each country's monetary policy instrument. Exchange rates changes are ln di¤er-ences of domestic currency per US dollar except for Poland where we use the DM or euro. Terms of trade, de…ned as the relative price of exports in terms of imports, are reported in changes by using the ln di¤erences.
Choice of prior
Here is an example of prior choices for the South African estimation reported in Table 2 
Estimation results
The graphs show rolling estimations of the policy parameters for a 10-year window. When data availability limited us from doing these rolling estimations since the begining, we performed recursive estimations adding one-quarter per estimation until we reached the 10-year sample from where we started the rolling estimation. The graphs report the estimated parameter and a 90% con…dence interval.
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